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We explore the managerial implications and economic consequences of platform sharing under  models
of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. By using a common platform across different products,
firms can save on fixed costs for platform development. At the same time, platform sharing imposes
restrictions on firms' ability to differentiate their products, and this reduces their profitability. It might
appear that platform sharing across firms makes consumers worse off because firms cooperate in their
product development processes to maximize their joint profit. We find, however, that platform sharing
across firms benefits consumers in our framework because it intensifies competition in our horizontal
differentiation model, and because it increases the quality of the lower-end product in our vertical
differentiation model. We also show new channels through which a merger makes consumers worse
off in the presence of platform sharing.
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Product platforms, which are component and subsystem assets shared across a family of
products,1 have recently attracted increasing attention in the product development/design
literature (see e.g. Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997; Nobeoka and Cusumano, 1997; Robertson
and Ulrich, 1998). Robertson and Ulrich (1998) conceptually articulated the trade-oﬀ that
ﬁrms face when they share a common platform across multiple products. On the one hand,
by sharing components and production processes across products, ﬁrms can develop diﬀer-
entiated products eﬃciently. That is, platform sharing reduces product development cost
and time because parts and assembly processes developed for one model do not have to be
developed and tested for the others. On the other hand, since components and produc-
tion processes are important factors in determining the nature of products, platform sharing
reduces the distinctiveness of products, which is valuable in the marketplace. Given this
important trade-oﬀ, Robertson and Ulrich proposed the platform-planning process through
which ﬁrms can achieve an optimal balance of commonality and distinctiveness.
Platform sharing has become common in the automobile industry; an automobile plat-
form means the core framework of cars which includes the ﬂoorpan, drive train, and axles.
An automobile manufacturer often uses a common platform for diﬀerent products with simi-
lar quality levels. For example, Mitsubishi shares a common platform between its Endeavour
and Galant, and Honda shares a common platform between its CR-V and Civic.2 A com-
mon platform can also be shared across manufacturers. Renault and Nissan have developed
a common platform for the Nissan Micra and the Renault Clio, and they plan to reduce the
number of platforms they use to 10 in 2010 from the 34 they had in 2000 (see e.g. Tierney et
al., 2000; Bremner et al., 2004). See also Szczesny (2003) for platform sharing between Ford
Motor and Mazda. These are examples of platform sharing across horizontally diﬀerentiated
products within a ﬁrm and across ﬁrms.
An automobile manufacturer can also share a common platform across multiple products
with diﬀerent quality levels. For example, Toyota uses a common platform for its Landcruiser
1This deﬁnition of product platforms is from Krishnan and Gupta (2001). Several authors have oﬀered
diﬀerent deﬁnitions. For example, Robertson and Ulrich (1998) deﬁned a product platform as the collection
of assets that are shared by a set of products.
2Mitsubishi’s Endeavour and Galant are in a similar price range, where the former is an SUV while the
latter is a sedan. Honda CR-V and Civic are also in a similar price range, where the former is an SUV while
the latter is a small sedan and hatch-back. See Rechtin and Kranz (2003) and Anonymous (2006).
1and Lexus LX 470, and Honda uses a common platform for its CR-V and Acura RDX.3 As
an example of platform sharing across ﬁrms, Porshe and Volkswagen use a common platform
for Porshe’s Cayenne and Volkswagen’s Touareg,4 where the former is more luxurious than
the latter. These are examples of platform sharing across vertically diﬀerentiated products
within a ﬁrm and across ﬁrms.
This paper explores the managerial implications and economic consequences of platform
sharing under product diﬀerentiation models. Motivated by examples in the automobile
industry as mentioned above, we consider platform sharing under horizontal product dif-
ferentiation and platform sharing under vertical product diﬀerentiation, and compare the
economic consequences of platform sharing under the two setups.
In Section 2 we incorporate platform sharing into a standard model of horizontal prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, due to Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), where we consider the
monopoly case and the duopoly case. In the monopoly case, one ﬁrm produces two diﬀeren-
tiated products 1 and 2, while in the duopoly case each ﬁrm i (= 1,2) produces product i.
Demand side of the model is characterized by the representative consumer who prefers prod-
uct variety. Platform sharing reduces the degree of product diﬀerentiation, which in turn
reduces the representative consumer’s willingness to pay. Because of this eﬀect, platform
sharing makes consumers worse oﬀ in the monopoly case. However, we ﬁnd that platform
sharing makes consumers better oﬀ in the duopoly case because platform sharing intensiﬁes
competition between the two ﬁrms by reducing the degree of diﬀerentiation in their prod-
ucts. Firms can still choose to share a common platform in order to save on their ﬁxed
costs for developing platforms. We then explore welfare consequences of horizontal mergers
in our framework and demonstrate a new channel through which horizontal mergers could
hurt consumers.
In Section 3 we explore the connection between platform sharing and vertical product
diﬀerentiation under a standard framework of product-line pricing (Mussa and Rosen, 1978),
where we focus on the two-type consumer case consisting of high-valuation consumers and
low-valuation consumers. On the production side, we again consider monopoly as well as
duopoly, and compare the two. In the case of monopoly, a single ﬁrm can produce a high-
quality product (H-product) and a low-quality product (L-product), while in the case of
3Lexus LX 470 is more luxurious than Toyota Landcruiser, and Acura RDX is more luxurious than Honda
CR-V. See Anonymous (2006) and Rechtin and Kranz (2003).
4We have conﬁrmed this by our written inquiry to Volkswagen.
2duopoly one ﬁrm can produce a high-quality product and the other ﬁrm can produce a
low-quality product. Platform sharing between an H-product and an L-product imposes
restrictions on ﬁrm’s abilities to diﬀerentiate the quality of products, which in turn increases
the amount of surplus captured by consumers in the equilibrium. In other words, platform
sharing increases the consumer surplus because its beneﬁt of ﬁxed cost savings has to be
shared between producers and consumers. We ﬁnd that a platform is more likely to be
shared in the duopoly case than in the monopoly case, and we demonstrate a new channel
through which the merger between H-ﬁrm and L-ﬁrm could make consumers worse oﬀ; that
is, the merger makes platform sharing less attractive for producers, and this can reduce the
consumer surplus because platform sharing beneﬁts consumers.
We will then conclude in Section 4 by discussing relationships between platform sharing
under horizontal product diﬀerentiation and that under vertical product diﬀerentiation.
The present paper is related to the previous analyses on cooperative research and de-
velopment (R&D) and research joint ventures (RJVs), given that platform sharing can be
regarded as an example of cooperative R&D and RJVs (see Katz, 1986; d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992; Motta, 1992; Choi, 1993, among
others). These previous papers, however, have not considered cases in which cooperative
R&D and RJVs aﬀect product characteristics.
A few previous papers have considered models that incorporate product platforms in
product diﬀerentiation models. Krishnan and Gupta (2001) incorporated product platforms
into a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation in which a ﬁrm chooses whether or not to
introduce a common platform across two separate products, and demonstrated that using a
common platform tends to result in the overdesign of low-end products (or the underdesign
of high-end products) in the ﬁrm’s product family. Ghosh and Morita (2006) considered a
diﬀerentiated duopoly model in which two ﬁrms can share a common platform to save on
their procurement costs from suppliers at the expense of the reduction in their horizontal
product diﬀerentiation. Ghosh and Morita (2006) also oﬀered an informal discussion on a
monopoly analysis of platform sharing under vertical product diﬀerentiation.5
The present paper’s contribution is to oﬀer more comprehensive and systematic analyses
of platform sharing by conducting both monopoly and duopoly analysis of platform sharing
5See also Lambertini, Poddar, and Sasaki (2002, 2003), who considered models of RJVs in which RJVs
between ﬁrms reduce the degree of their product diﬀerentiation, and explored the eﬀects of forming an RJV
on the sustainability of implicit price collusion.
3under horizontal product diﬀerentiation and that under vertical product diﬀerentiation. As
mentioned above, Krishnan and Gupta (2001) focused on a monopolist’s platform-sharing
decision under vertical product diﬀerentiation, while Ghosh and Morita (2006) focused on
platform sharing under horizontal product diﬀerentiation in the duopoly case with an infor-
mal discussion on a monopoly analysis of platform sharing under vertical product diﬀerenti-
ation. Through our comprehensive and systematic analyses of platform sharing, we explore
eﬀects of mergers in the presence of platform sharing, and compare welfare consequences of
platform sharing under horizontal product diﬀerentiation and that under vertical product
diﬀerentiation.
2 Platform sharing under horizontal product diﬀeren-
tiation
In this section we incorporate platform sharing into a standard model of horizontal product
diﬀerentiation, due to Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984). On the production side, we
consider and compare monopoly and duopoly. In the monopoly case, a single ﬁrm produces
two diﬀerentiated products, while in the duopoly case, each ﬁrm produces one product.
2.1 Monopoly
2.1.1 The Model
Consider a monopolist who produces two products, 1 and 2. Let pi and qi denote the
price and quantity of product i(= 1,2). There is a continuum of consumers with identical
preferences, and the representative consumer’s utility function is given by U(q1,q2) = a(q1+
q2) − (q2
1 + 2bq1q2 + q2
2)/2, where a > 0 and b ∈ (0,1). The parameter b captures the degree
of diﬀerentiation between the two products, where the degree of product diﬀerentiation
decreases as b increases. The representative consumer maximizes U(q1,q2) − p1q1 − p2q2
which yields linear inverse demands
pi = a − qi − bqj, i,j ∈ {1,2};i 6= j. (1)
Inverting the inverse demand system yields the direct demands:
qi =
(1 − b)a − pi + bpj
1 − b2 , i,j ∈ {1,2};i 6= j. (2)
4The monopolist’s cost for producing qi units of product i(= 1,2) is ciqi+Fi where ci and
Fi respectively denote the constant marginal cost and the ﬁxed cost for production. Without
loss of generality we normalize c1 = c2 = 0.
We incorporate the option of platform sharing in the following way: Assume that F1 =
F2 = F (> 0) if the monopolist uses diﬀerent platforms for the two products, while F1 = F2 =
(1−s)F if it uses a common platform for both products, where s ∈ (0,1) captures the degree
of cost saving. That is, by sharing a platform, the monopolist saves 2[F − (1 − s)F] = 2sF
of its total ﬁxed costs. On the other hand, the monopolist loses some product diﬀerentiation
by sharing a platform. We capture this eﬀect by assuming that b = b0 if the monopolist
does not share a platform, while b = b0 + x if it does share a platform, where b0 ∈ (0,1)
and x ∈ (0,1 − b0).6 That is, under platform sharing, the degree of product diﬀerentiation
decreases by x.
We consider the two-stage game described below:
[Stage 1] The monopolist decides whether or not to use a common platform for the two
products, 1 and 2. If the monopolist does not share a platform, then F1 = F2 = F and
b = b0, while F1 = F2 = (1 − s)F and b = b0 + x if it does share a platform.
[Stage 2] The monopolist chooses (p1,p2) to maximize its proﬁt.
2.1.2 Analysis of the monopoly case
The game described above has two Stage 2 subgames. One is the subgame in which the
monopolist shared a platform at Stage 1, while the other is the one in which it did not share
a platform. We call the former subgame a platform-sharing subgame, and the latter, a non-





which ensures that the ﬁxed cost for production is low enough for the monopolist to sell a
strictly positive amount of each product i (= 1,2) in the equilibrium of each subgame.
At stage 2, the monopolist chooses p1 and p2 to maximize its stage 2 proﬁt, which
is p1q1 + p2q2 ≡
p1((1−b)a−p1+bp2)+p2((1−b)a−p2+bp1)
1−b2 . Let pm
i (b) and qm
i (b) denote product i’s
price and quantity, respectively, in the equilibrium of the stage 2 subgame characterized by
diﬀerentiation parameter b (recall that b = b0 + x in the platform-sharing subgame while
6This set up for platform sharing under horizontal product diﬀerentiation was employed by our previous
model analyzed in Ghosh and Morita (2006). See also Lin and Saggi (2002) for a related modelling choice
in their analysis of the relationship between process and product R&D.
5b = b0 in the non-platform-sharing subgame). We ﬁnd:
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where πm(b) denotes the monopolist’s stage 2 proﬁt in the equilibrium.
At stage 1, the monopolist anticipates that its overall proﬁt will be πNP ≡ πm(b0)−2F if it
does not share a platform, and πPS ≡ πm(b0+x)−2(1−s)F if it does share a platform. Hence
the monopolist chooses to share a platform if and only if πPS ≥ πNP, which is equivalent to
2sF ≥ π
m(b0) − π
m(b0 + x). (3)
We are now ready to present our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1: There exists a function xm(s) such that the monopolist shares a platform
in the equilibrium if and only if x ≤ xm(s), where xm(s) is strictly increasing in s and
xm(s) ∈ (0,1 − b0) for all s ∈ (0,1).
Proposition 1 tells us that the monopolist chooses to share a platform when the loss of
product diﬀerentiation due to platform sharing, captured by x, is relatively small. Under
platform sharing, a lower degree of product diﬀerentiation between products 1 and 2 reduces
the representative consumer’s willingness to pay because he/she prefers product variety. The
lower willingness to pay, in turn, reduces the monopolist’s proﬁtability. This disadvantage of
platform sharing is represented by the RHS of inequality (3), πm(b0)−πm(b0 +x). We have
that the monopolist’s stage 2 proﬁt πm(b) is strictly decreasing in b, given that the degree
of product diﬀerentiation decreases as b increases in this model. Hence the disadvantage is
increasing in x, while the ﬁxed cost saving due to platform sharing, captured by 2sF in the
LHS of inequality (3), is not aﬀected by x. The result is that the monopolist chooses to
share a platform if x is relatively small, where the threshold xm(s) is strictly increasing in s.
That is, the monopolist is more likely to share a platform as the degree of ﬁxed-cost savings
due to platform sharing (captured by s) increases.
Next we analyze the welfare consequences of platform sharing.
6Proposition 2: Let CSPS(CSNP) denote the consumer surplus in the equilibrium of the
platform-sharing (non-platform-sharing) subgame, and deﬁne TSPS(TSNP) analogously for
the total surplus. Then
(i) CSPS < CSNP holds for all x ∈ (0,1 − b0).
(ii) There exists a function ˜ x(s) such that TSPS > TSNP holds if and only if x < ˜ x(s), where
˜ x(s) ∈ (0,xm(s)) for all s ∈ (0,1).
As mentioned above, platform sharing reduces the representative consumer’s willingness
to pay, and this reduces the consumer surplus as well as the monopolist’s stage 2 proﬁt. Hence
the consumer surplus is lower under the platform-sharing subgame for all x. This negative
impact to consumers is not taken into account when the monopolist, who can beneﬁt from
platform sharing through ﬁxed-cost savings, determines whether or not to share a platform.
If x < ˜ x(s), the beneﬁt of platform sharing to the monopolist is greater than its negative
externality to consumers so that platform sharing increases the total surplus. While, if
˜ x(s) < x < xm(s), the monopolist still shares a platform but its beneﬁt to the monopolist is




We consider the case of duopoly under the demand and the cost structures that are the same
as in the monopoly case. The only diﬀerence is that now there are two ﬁrms, ﬁrms 1 and 2,
where each ﬁrm i (= 1,2) produces product i.
We consider the two-stage game described below:
[Stage 1] Firms 1 and 2 jointly decide whether or not to use a common platform for their
products. If they do not share a platform, then F1 = F2 = F and b = b0, while F1 = F2 =
(1 − s)F and b = b0 + x if they do share a platform.
[Stage 2] Each ﬁrm i chooses pi to maximize its own proﬁt, taking pj as given.
2.2.2 Analysis of the duopoly case
As in the monopoly case, the stage 2 subgame in which the two ﬁrms shared (did not share) a
platform at stage 1 is called platform-sharing (non-platform-sharing) subgame. Throughout




(1−s)(2−b0−x)2(1+b0+x)}, which ensures that the
ﬁxed cost for production is low enough for each ﬁrm i to sell a strictly positive amount of
product i in the equilibrium of each subgame.




i (b) respectively denote ﬁrm i’s price, quantity, and proﬁt of ﬁrm i in the equilibrium of
the stage 2 subgame characterized by diﬀerentiation parameter b (recall that b = b0 + x in

























(2 − b)2(1 + b)
≡ π
d(b).
At stage 1, each ﬁrm i anticipates that its overall proﬁt will be πNP ≡ πd(b0) − F if the
two ﬁrms do not share a common platform, and πPS = πd(b0+x)−(1−s)F if they do share




d(b0 + x). (4)
Proposition 3 below identiﬁes the condition in which this inequality holds.
Proposition 3: There exists a function xd(s) such that ﬁrms 1 and 2 share a common
platform in the equilibrium if and only if x ≤ xd(s), where xd(s) is strictly increasing in s
and xd(s) ∈ (0,1 − b0) for all s ∈ (0,1).
As in the monopoly case, platform sharing reduces the degree of product diﬀerentiation
between ﬁrms 1 and 2, which decreases their proﬁtability by reducing the representative
consumer’s willingness to pay. Equally important is that in the duopoly case, the lower
degree of product diﬀerentiation intensiﬁes the competition between the two ﬁrms, which
further reduces their proﬁtability. The result is that ﬁrms 1 and 2 choose to share a common
platform if x, the loss of product diﬀerentiation due to platform sharing, is relatively small.
The threshold xd(s) is strictly increasing in s, the degree of ﬁxed-cost savings due to platform
sharing.
8Next we analyze the welfare consequences of platform sharing.
Proposition 4: Let CSPS(CSNP) denote the consumer surplus in the equilibrium of the
platform-sharing (non-platform-sharing) subgame, and deﬁne TSPS(TSNP) analogously for
the total surplus. Then
(i) CSPS > CSNP holds for all x ∈ (0,1 − b0).
(ii) There exists a function ˆ x(s) such that TSPS > TSNP holds if and only if x < ˆ x(s), where
ˆ x(s) ∈ (xd(s),1 − b0) for all s ∈ (0,1).
In the monopoly case, we found in Proposition 2 that platform sharing reduces the
consumer surplus because it reduces product variety, which consumers prefer. In contrast,
Proposition 4 tells us that platform sharing increases the consumer surplus in the duopoly
case. This is because the lower degree of product diﬀerentiation intensiﬁes the competition
between the two ﬁrms, and this positive eﬀect on consumers dominates the negative eﬀect
associated with lower product variety. Regarding the total surplus, platform sharing increases
the total surplus for all x ∈ (0,xd(s)] because platform sharing increases the two ﬁrms’ joint
proﬁt whenever they choose to share a platform. In fact, the threshold ˆ x(s) is greater than
xd(s), because the higher consumer surplus dominates the lower proﬁts of the ﬁrms when
xd(s) < x < ˆ x(s).
2.3 Comparison
Finally, we compare the monopoly case and the duopoly case, and discuss the welfare con-
sequences of a merger in our framework.
Proposition 5: A platform is more likely to be shared in the monopoly case than in the
duopoly case. More precisely, xd(s) < xm(s) holds.
As mentioned earlier, platform sharing in this model reduces the representative con-
sumer’s willingness to pay in the monopoly case as well as in the duopoly case. Furthermore,
in the duopoly case, platform sharing intensiﬁes the competition between the two ﬁrms. Be-
cause of the latter eﬀect, the disadvantage of platform sharing for ﬁrms is greater in the
duopoly case than in the monopoly case, while the advantage of platform sharing (ﬁxed-cost
saving) is the same across the two cases. Hence, platform is more likely to be shared in the
monopoly case as stated in the proposition.
9Now suppose xd(s) < x < xm(s) holds so that a platform is shared only in the monopoly
case, and suppose that ﬁrms 1 and 2 merge to become a monopolist. In this parameter range,
the horizontal merger makes consumers worse oﬀ in two ways. On the one hand, the merger
eliminates competition between the two ﬁrms, which hurts consumers by raising prices. In
addition to this standard eﬀect, the merger induces the merged ﬁrm to share a platform,
which makes consumers worse oﬀ by reducing product variety. By capturing the connection
between platform sharing and horizontal product diﬀerentiation, our analysis shows a new
channel through which mergers could hurt consumers.
3 Platform sharing under vertical product diﬀerentia-
tion
In this section, we explore the connection between platform sharing and vertical product
diﬀerentiation under a standard framework of product-line pricing (Mussa and Rosen, 1978),
where we focus on the two-type consumer case.7 On the production side, we consider and
compare monopoly and duopoly. In the case of monopoly, a single ﬁrm can produce a high-
quality product and a low-quality product, while in the case of duopoly one ﬁrm can produce
a high-quality product and the other ﬁrm can produce a low-quality product.
3.1 Monopoly case
3.1.1 The Model
Consider a monopolist that faces two groups of consumers, and which can produce output
of two levels of quality: a high-quality product (H-product) and a low-quality product (L-
product). The quality of the product is in part determined by the quality of the platform.
In particular, assume that the quality of H-product is given by QH = H + x ≡ QH(x),
where H > 0 is a given constant and x ≥ 0 is a choice variable representing the quality
of the platform. Analogously, the quality of L-product is given by QL = L + x ≡ QL(x),
where H > L > 0. The monopolist can produce k-product (k = H, L) at constant marginal
cost ck + φ(x), where φ(.) is a convex cost function with standard properties, and cH and
cL are given constants satisfying cH > cL > 0. In addition, the monopolist incurs ﬁxed
7See, for example, Waldman (1996) for an analysis focusing on the two-type case.
10costs for developing platforms. If the monopolist develops just one type of platform with
quality level x, the ﬁxed cost is η(x). Alternatively, if it develops two types of platforms
with quality levels xH for H-product and xL for L-product (xH 6= xL), then the ﬁxed cost
is η(xH) + η(xL), where η(.) is a convex cost function with standard properties. In order
to simplify the analysis and obtain closed form solutions, specify φ(x) ≡ x2
2 and η(x) ≡ θx2
2
where θ > 0.
Let the two groups of consumers be denoted groups 1 and 2, where group j consists of
a continuum of nonatomic consumers of mass mj, j = 1,2. A representative individual in
group j consumes either zero units or one unit of the products, and derives a gross beneﬁt
of vjQk(x), k = H or L from the consumption of one unit of quality Qk(x) product, where
v1 > v2 >
cL
L .8
We consider the two-stage game described below.
[Stage 1] The monopolist determines whether it develops one type of platform with quality
x, or two types of platforms with quality levels xH for H-product and xL for L-product,
xH 6= xL.
[Stage 2] If the monopolist sells both H-product and L-product, then it chooses their prices,
denoted PH and PL respectively. If the monopolist sells k-product only, then it chooses its
price Pk. Consumers then make purchase decisions.
In what follows, we say that the monopolist shares a platform between H-product and
L-product if it produces both H-product and L-product by using one type of platform
with quality x, while we say that the monopolist does not share a platform if it produces
both H-product and L-product by using two types of platforms with qualities xH and xL
respectively.
3.1.2 Analysis of the monopoly case
Suppose that the monopolist develops two types of platforms with qualities xH and xL, and
sells both H-product and L-product; that is, the monopolist does not share a platform.
Under this option, it can be easily shown that the monopolist sells H-product with quality
QH(xH) to all type 1 consumers and L-product with quality QL(xL) to all type 2 consumers,
where xH > xL > 0 holds. At stage 2, the monopolist charges the price PL ≡ v2QL(xL) to
type 2 consumers and the price PH ≡ v1QH(xH) − (v1 − v2)QL(xL) to type 1 consumers.
8v2 > cL
L implies that the net value of L-product is positive even for lower-valuation consumers.
11Note that the monopolist can capture the entire surplus from type 2 consumers, while, due
to imperfect substitutability between H-product and L-product, the monopolist has to leave
(v1 − v2)QL(xL) as a surplus for type 1 consumers. Hence the monopolist’s overall proﬁt
under this option is given by πNP(xH,xL) (“NP” stands for non-platform-sharing), where
πNP(xH,xL) ≡ m1[v1QH(xH) − (v1 − v2)QL(xL) − cH − φ(xH)]
+m2[v2QL(xL) − cL − φ(xL)] − η(xH) − η(xL). (5)
Alternatively, suppose that the monopolist develops one type of platform with quality x.
Then, there are three relevant options for the monopolist. First, the monopolist can share a
platform between H-product and L-product, sell H-product with quality QH(x) at the price
of v1QH(x)−(v1 −v2)QL(x) to all type 1 consumers, and sell L-product with quality QL(x)
at the price of v2QL(x) to all type 2 consumers. The monopolist’s overall proﬁt under this
option is given by πPS(x) (“PS” stands for platform sharing), where
πPS(x) ≡ m1[v1QH(x)−(v1 −v2)QL(x)−cH −φ(x)]+m2[v2QL(x)−cL −φ(x)]−η(x). (6)
The second option for the monopolist is that it can sell just H-product to type 1 and type 2
consumers or to type 1 consumers only. Finally, the third relevant option for the monopolist
is to sell just L-product to type 1 and type 2 consumers or to type 1 consumers only.
In what follows, we will proceed with our analysis under several parameter restrictions in
order to focus our analysis. First, we assume that v2H −cH > v2L−cL ⇔ v2 >
cH−cL
H−L holds.
Under this assumption, H-product is more proﬁtable than L-product for the monopolist in
the sense that, if it chooses to sell one type of the product, it chooses to sell H-product.
Second, given that our focus is on the monopolist’s decision concerning whether or not to
share a platform between H-product and L-product, we consider a range of parameterizations
in which, even if the monopolist develops just one type of platform, it sells both H-product





(ii)(m1 + m2)v2 − m1v1 > 0, and (iii) L > ˜ L. Condition (i) implies that the monopolist
is better oﬀ by selling type-2 consumers L-product rather than H-product, and condition
(ii) and (iii) together imply that the monopolist is better oﬀ by selling type-2 consumers
L-product rather than nothing.
Lemma 1: Suppose that the monopolist develops one type of platform only. For any
given parameterization satisfying v2 >
cH−cL
H−L , there exists a unique value ˜ L ≥ 0 such that




m2 , (ii) (m1 + m2)v2 − m1v1 > 0, and (iii) L > ˜ L. There exists a range
of parameterizations in which (i)-(iii) are satisﬁed.
We are now ready to present our results.
Proposition 6: There exists a unique value ˜ v2, m1
m1+m2v1 < ˜ v2 < v1, such that:
(i) If v2 > ˜ v2, the monopolist chooses to share a platform, and sells H-product with quality
QH(x∗) to all type 1 consumers and L-product with quality QL(x∗) to all type 2 consumers,
where x∗ = m1+m2
θ+m1+m2v2.
(ii) If v2 < ˜ v2, the monopolist chooses not to share a platform, and sells H-product with
quality QH(x∗
H) to all type 1 consumers and L-product with quality QL(x∗







Suppose that the monopolist develops two types of platforms with qualities xH and xL
for H-product and L-product respectively. Given that the platform’s quality is an important
determinant of the product’s quality, the monopolist sets the level of xL lower than the level
of xH for two reasons. First, since L-product is sold to low-valuation (type 2) consumers and
H-product is sold to high-valuation (type 1) consumers, the marginal beneﬁt of raising the
platform’s quality is lower for L-product. Second, due to imperfect substitutability between
H-product and L-product, the price that the monopolist can charge for H-product increases
as the quality of L-product decreases, and hence it can increase its revenue from H-product
by reducing xL. In other words, by reducing xL, the monopolist can reduce the amount of
surplus (v1 − v2)QL(xL) that has to be left with each type 1 consumer.
Platform sharing reduces the monopolist’s proﬁtability by preventing the monopolist
from diﬀerentiating the quality of the platform for H-product and L-product. As the value
of v2 increases, the diﬀerence between type 1 consumers and type 2 consumers becomes less
important, which in turn reduces the disadvantage of platform sharing for the monopolist.
Proposition 1 tells us that when the value of v2 exceeds the threshold ˜ v2, the disadvantage of
platform sharing is dominated by its advantage of ﬁxed-cost savings so that the monopolist
chooses to share a platform.
Next we turn to welfare consequences of platform sharing.
Proposition 7: Let CSPS(CSNP) denote the consumer surplus in the equilibrium of the
platform-sharing (non-platform-sharing) subgame, and deﬁne TSPS(TSNP) analogously for
13the total surplus. Then
(i) CSPS > CSNP holds for all v2 ∈ ( m1
m1+m2v1,v1).
(ii) There exists a value ˜ v0
2 ∈ [ m1
m1+m2v1, ˜ v2) such that TSPS > TSNP holds if v2 > ˜ v0
2, while
TSPS < TSNP holds if v2 < ˜ v0
2.
As mentioned earlier, in the equilibrium of both subgames the monopolist captures the
entire surplus from type 2 consumers, while it has to leave a surplus to be captured by type
1 consumers. If the monopolist does not share a platform, it can reduce the amount of the
surplus by reducing the platform’s quality for L-product. Under platform sharing, however,
the monopolist cannot diﬀerentiate the quality of platforms for H-product and L-product,
and consequently the surplus for type 1 consumers becomes higher. The result is that
the consumer surplus is higher in the platform-sharing subgame than in the non-platform-
sharing subgame. The monopolist saves on ﬁxed costs by sharing a platform, but the beneﬁt
of the ﬁxed-cost saving is in part captured by type 1 consumers. Because of this positive
externality to consumers, the total surplus is higher in the platform-sharing subgame than
in the non-platform-sharing subgame whenever the monopolist chooses to share a platform.
3.2 Duopoly case
3.2.1 The Model
We consider the case of duopoly under the structures of supply and demand that are analo-
gous to those in the monopoly case analyzed in the previous subsection. Consider two ﬁrms,
ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L, that face two groups of consumers. The quality of each ﬁrm’s product
is in part determined by the quality of the platform. In particular, assume that the quality
of ﬁrm H’s product is given by QH = H + x ≡ QH(x) and the quality of ﬁrm L’s product
is given by QL = L + x ≡ QL(x). As in the monopoly case, x ≥ 0 is a choice variable
representing the quality of the platform, and H > L > 0.9 Firm k (= H, L) can produce
product of quality Qk(x) at constant marginal cost ck + φ(x) and ﬁxed cost η(x), where
φ(x) ≡ x2
2 and η(x) ≡ θx2
2 (θ > 0) and cH > cL > 0. The structure of the demand side is the
same as in the monopoly case.
We consider the two-stage game described below.
9We also assume H−L > v1 in the duopoly case, which is a suﬃcient condition to rule out an equilibrium
in which ﬁrm H sells H-product to type 2 consumers while ﬁrm L sells L-product to type 1 consumers.
14[Stage 1] The two ﬁrms jointly determine whether to jointly develop one type of platform
or to separately develop their own platforms.
• If they develop platforms separately, each ﬁrm k (= H, L) simultaneously and non-




• If they jointly develop one type of platform, ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L jointly determine the
quality of the common platform xC by incurring the joint ﬁxed cost of
x2
C
2 . At the same








[Stage 2] Each ﬁrm k simultaneously and non-cooperatively announces the price Pk of its
product, and consumers then make purchase decisions.
In what follows, we say that the two ﬁrms share a platform if they jointly develop one
type of platform, while we say that they do not share a platform if they develop platforms
separately.
3.2.2 Analysis of the duopoly case
In what follows we impose the same parameter restrictions as in our analysis of the monopoly
case, and focus on cases in which each ﬁrm k (= H,L) sells a positive amount of k-product
in the equilibrium of any stage 2 subgame. In particular, given Lemma 2 below, we assume
that L > ˆ L holds.
Lemma 2: Suppose that ﬁrms H and L develop platforms separately at stage 1. There
exists a unique value ˆ L ≥ 0 such that in the subsequent stage 2 equilibrium, each ﬁrm k sells
a positive amount of k-product if and only if L > ˆ L.
Suppose that ﬁrms H and L jointly develop one type of platform with quality xC at stage
1. Under this option, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms H and L maximize their joint proﬁt by choosing
xC = m1+m2
θ+m1+m2v2 ≡ ˆ x∗
C, which is the same as the monopolist’s choice of platform quality under
platform sharing. In the subsequent stage 2 equilibrium, ﬁrm H sells H-product with quality
QH(ˆ x∗
C) at the price of v1QH(ˆ x∗
C) − (v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
C) to all type 1 consumers, and ﬁrm L
sells L-product with quality QL(ˆ x∗
C) at the price of v2QL(ˆ x∗
C) to all type 2 consumers. Hence
10We allow the possibility of either yH or yL being negative. In such a case, a side payment is made from
one ﬁrm to the other.
15their joint proﬁt is the same as the monopolist’s overall proﬁt when it shares a platform,
πPS(ˆ x∗
C).
Alternatively, suppose that ﬁrms H and L develop platforms separately at stage 1. Under
this option, ﬁrm H sells H-product with quality QH(xH) at the price of v1QH(xH) − (v1 −
v2)QL(xL) to all type 1 consumers, and its overall proﬁt is
πH(xH,xL) ≡ m1[v1QH(xH) − (v1 − v2)QL(xL) − cH − φ(xH)] − η(xH). (7)
On the other hand, ﬁrm L sells L-product with quality QL(xL) at the price of v2QL(xL) to
all type 2 consumers, and its overall proﬁt is
πL(xH,xL) ≡ m2(v2QL(xL) − cL − φ(xL)) − η(xL). (8)
We ﬁnd that ﬁrm H’s optimal choice of platform quality is ˆ x∗
H ≡ m1
θ+m1v1, while ﬁrm L’s
optimal choice is ˆ x∗
L ≡ m2
θ+m2v2.
Proposition 8: There exists a unique value ¯ v2, m1
m1+m2v1 ≤ ¯ v2 < v1, such that (i) and (ii)
below hold, where m1









(i) If v2 > ¯ v2, ﬁrms H and L jointly develop one type of platform with quality ˆ x∗
C ≡
m1+m2
θ+m1+m2v2, ﬁrm H sells H-product with quality QH(ˆ x∗
C) to type 1 consumers, and ﬁrm L
sells L-product with quality QL(ˆ x∗
C) to type 2 consumers.





θ+m2v2 respectively. Then, ﬁrm H sells H-product with quality QH(ˆ x∗
H) to type 1
consumers, and ﬁrm L sells L-product with quality QL(ˆ x∗
L) to type 2 consumers.
In addition to the ﬁxed cost savings, there is an additional advantage of platform sharing
in the duopoly case. That is, ﬁrms H and L can jointly choose the quality of the shared
platform at the level that maximizes their joint proﬁt in the subsequent equilibrium. Because
of this, ﬁrms H and L can achieve a joint proﬁt which is the same amount as the monopolist’s
proﬁt when it shares a platform. At the same time, however, the quality of platform for H-
product and L-product cannot be diﬀerentiated, and this is the disadvantage for the two
ﬁrms sharing a platform. As in the monopoly case, the disadvantage of platform sharing
becomes smaller as the value of v2 increases. Proposition 8 tells us that when the value of v2
exceeds the threshold ¯ v2, the disadvantage of platform sharing is dominated by its advantage
so that the two ﬁrms choose to share a platform.
16We now turn to the welfare consequences of platform sharing.
Proposition 9: Let CSPS(CSNP) denote the consumer surplus in the equilibrium of the
platform-sharing (non-platform-sharing) subgame, and deﬁne TSPS(TSNP) analogously for
the total surplus. Then
(i) CSPS > CSNP holds for all v2 ∈ ( m1
m1+m2v1,v1).
(ii) There exists a value ¯ v0
2 ∈ [ m1
m1+m2v1, ¯ v2) such that TSPS > TSNP holds if v2 > ¯ v0
2 while
TSPS < TSNP holds if v2 < ¯ v0
2.
Platform sharing by ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L could be perceived as an anticompetitive action
because the two ﬁrms jointly choose the quality of a shared platform to maximize their joint
proﬁt. However, Proposition 9 tells us that platform sharing increases both the consumer
surplus and the total surplus whenever the two ﬁrms choose to share a platform. The logic
here is as follows: Whether or not the two ﬁrms share a platform, ﬁrm L captures the entire
surplus from type 2 consumers by selling them L-product at the price of v2QL. On the
other hand, due to imperfect substitutability between H-product and L-product, ﬁrm H
has to leave (v1 − v2)QL as a surplus for type 1 consumers. Given that the quality of the
platform cannot be diﬀerentiated for H-product and L-product when the two ﬁrms share
a platform, platform sharing increases the quality of L-product in the equilibrium, which
in turn increases the consumer surplus by leaving more surplus to be captured by type 1
consumers. The result is that the consumer surplus is higher in the platform-sharing subgame
than in the non-platform-sharing subgame. As in the monopoly case, the ﬁxed cost savings
from sharing a platform are shared between the ﬁrms and the consumers. Consequently, the
total surplus is higher in the platform-sharing subgame than in the non-platform-sharing
subgame whenever the two ﬁrms choose to share a platform.
3.3 Comparison
In this subsection we compare the monopoly case and the duopoly case, and explore the
welfare consequences of mergers in our framework.
Proposition 10: Platforms are more likely to be shared in the duopoly case than in the
monopoly case. More precisely, ¯ v2 < ˜ v2 holds.
The logic here is as follows: Recall that because of imperfect substitutability between
17H-product and L-product, the maximum price that can be charged for H-product declines
as the quality of L-product increases. Under non-platform sharing in the monopoly case, the
monopolist takes this eﬀect into account when it chooses xL (the quality of the platform for
L-product). On the other hand, under non-platform sharing in the duopoly case, ﬁrm L does
not take this eﬀect into account when it chooses xL. The result is that under non-platform
sharing, the two ﬁrms’ joint proﬁt in the duopoly case is lower than the monopolist’s proﬁt
in the monopoly case, which in turn implies that the producers’ beneﬁt of platform sharing
is higher in the duopoly case. This results in ¯ v2 < ˜ v2.
Finally, in Proposition 11 we consider welfare consequences of the merger between ﬁrm
H and L.
Proposition 11:
(i) If v2 < ˜ v2, then the merger between ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L increases the producer surplus
while it reduces the consumer surplus and the total surplus.
(ii) If v2 > ˜ v2, then the merger between ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L does not aﬀect the producer
surplus, the consumer surplus, or the total surplus.
If v2 < ¯ v2 (< ˜ v2 by Proposition 10), a platform is not shared in the monopoly case or
the duopoly case. The monopolist maximizes its proﬁt by lowering the platform’s quality
for L-product at an optimally low level, while the quality of the platform for L-product is
chosen to be higher in the duopoly case. The higher platform quality of L-product results
in a higher consumer surplus and total surplus and a lower producer surplus in the duopoly
case. Suppose v2 takes a higher value so that ¯ v2 < v2 < ˜ v2 holds. Then a platform is shared
in the duopoly case and not shared in the monopoly case. Platform sharing further increases
the platform quality of L-product, which results in a higher consumer surplus and total
surplus in the duopoly case. Finally, if v2 > ˜ v2, a platform is shared in both cases. In the
duopoly case, ﬁrm H and ﬁrm L jointly choose the quality of the platform that maximizes
their joint proﬁt in the subsequent equilibrium, and so the equilibrium outcomes are the
same across the monopoly case and the duopoly case.
In our framework, the merger can reduce the consumer surplus through two channels
when v2 < ˜ v2 (so that the monopolist does not share a platform). The merged ﬁrm maxi-
mizes its proﬁtability by setting the platform quality of L-product lower, which reduces the
surplus captured by type 1 consumers. Furthermore, the merger makes platform sharing less
attractive for producers, and this can further reduce the consumer surplus because platform
18sharing beneﬁts type 1 consumers by increasing the surplus they can capture.
4 Conclusion
We have explored the managerial implications and economic consequences of platform shar-
ing by analyzing two models; one model incorporates platform sharing into a horizontal
product diﬀerentiation model, and the other incorporates it into a vertical product diﬀer-
entiation model. In this section we conclude the paper by discussing relationships between
platform sharing under horizontal product diﬀerentiation and that under vertical product
diﬀerentiation.
In both models, the advantage of platform sharing is, simply, ﬁxed-cost savings. That
is, ﬁrms can save on ﬁxed costs for platform development by using a common platform
across two diﬀerent products. In the horizontal product diﬀerentiation model, platform
sharing reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁtability by decreasing the representative consumer’s willingness
to pay. Also, in the duopoly case, platform sharing further reduces ﬁrms’ proﬁtability by
intensifying competition between ﬁrms. In the vertical product diﬀerentiation model, the
quality of platform for the high-quality product and that for the low-quality product cannot
be diﬀerentiated under platform sharing, and this is the disadvantage of platform sharing
for producers. The disadvantage is relatively small when the loss of product diﬀerentiation
due to platform sharing is small (in the former model) or when the diﬀerence between
high-valuation consumers and low-valuation consumers is small (in the latter model), and a
common platform is shared in the equilibrium when the disadvantage is small enough.
It might appear that platform sharing across ﬁrms makes consumers worse oﬀ because
ﬁrms cooperate in their product development process by sharing a common platform to
maximize their joint proﬁt. We have found, however, that in our duopoly cases, platform
sharing increases consumer surplus in both models. In the horizontal product diﬀerentiation
model, platform sharing reduces product variety which consumers prefer. At the same time,
platform sharing also intensiﬁes competition between the two ﬁrms, and we have found that
this positive eﬀect on consumers dominates the negative eﬀect of reduced product variety
so that platform sharing increases consumer surplus. In the vertical product diﬀerentiation
model, the equilibrium quality of the low-quality product is higher under platform sharing,
and this in turn increases the amount of surplus that high-valuation consumers can capture.
In the monopoly case, platform sharing under vertical product diﬀerentiation makes
19consumers better oﬀ through the same logic as in the duopoly case mentioned above. On the
other hand, platform sharing under horizontal product diﬀerentiation makes consumers worse
oﬀ, because platform sharing cannot beneﬁt consumers by intensifying competition in the
monopoly case. In other words, welfare consequences of platform sharing under horizontal
product diﬀerentiation critically depends on the competitiveness of the product market. This
ﬁnding suggests that antitrust authorities should carefully investigate the competitiveness of
product market in order to determine welfare consequences of platform sharing if it is under
horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
By incorporating platform sharing into product diﬀerentiation models, our analyses have
shown new channels through which mergers negatively aﬀect consumers. In the horizontal
diﬀerentiation model, a merger can induce the merged ﬁrm to share a platform, which further
decreases the consumer surplus by reducing product variety. In the vertical diﬀerentiation
model, a platform is less likely to be shared when the two ﬁrms merge to become one ﬁrm.
This negatively aﬀects consumers because more surplus can be captured by consumers under
platform sharing in this model.
In this paper we have analyzed platform sharing under horizontal product diﬀerentiation
and that under vertical product diﬀerentiation separately in two diﬀerent models. In reality,
a common platform is often shared across products that are diﬀerentiated both horizontally
and vertically. In our future work, we plan to analyze platform sharing in such a setup.
20Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Inequality (3) is equivalent to s − h(x) ≥ 0, where h(x) ≡
a2x
4F(1+b0)(1+b0+x). We have (i) s − h(0) = s > 0, (ii) limx→1−b0 s − h(x) = s −
a2(1−b0)
8F(1+b0) < 0
and (iii) h0(x) = a2
4F(1+b0+x)2 > 0. Together (i) - (iii) imply that there exists a unique value
˘ x ∈ (0,1 − b0) such that s − h(x) > (=,<)0 if and only if x < (=,>)˘ x, where s − h(˘ x) ≡ 0.
We have that d˘ x
ds = 1
h0(˘ x) > 0, and letting ˘ x ≡ xm(s) implies the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Deﬁne CSm(b) ≡ U(qm
1 (b),qm
2 (b)) − pm
1 (b)qm




4(1+b). We then ﬁnd CSPS − CSNP = CSm(b0 + x) − CSm(b0) = − a2x
4(1+b0)(1+b0+x) < 0 for all
x ∈ (0,1−b0). This proves 2(i). Regarding 2(ii), we have πPS−πNP = 2sF− 2a2x
4(1+b0)(1+b0+x) =
2F(s − h(x)), and hence TSPS − TSNP = πPS − πNP + CSPS − CSNP = 2F(s − h(x)) −
a2x
4(1+b0)(1+b0+x) ≡ g(x). We have g(0) = 2sF > 0, g(xm(s)) = −
a2xm(s)
4(1+b0)(1+b0+xm(s)) < 0 and
g0(x) = −2Fh0(x) − a2
4((1+b0+x)2 < 0. This implies 2(ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Firms 1 and 2 share platform in stage 1 if and only if sF ≥ πd(b0)−





We have (i) s − k(0) = s > 0, (ii) limx→1−b0 s − k(x) = s −
a2(1−b0)
F(2−b0)2(1+b0) < 0, and (iii)
k0(x) =
2a2(1−(b0+x)+(b0+x)2)
F(2−(b0+x))3(1+(b0+x))2 > 0. Together (i) - (iii) imply that there exists a unique value
˘ x ∈ (0,1 − b0) such that s − k(x) > (=,<)0 if and only if x < (=,>)˘ x, where s − k(˘ x) ≡ 0.
We have that d˘ x
ds = 1
k0(˘ x) > 0, and letting ˘ x ≡ xd(s) implies the result. Q.E.D.












implies 4(i). We have that TSPS ≡ CSPS + 2πPS and TSNP ≡ CSNP + 2πNP, and that





0 implies 4(ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Recall that platform is shared in the monopoly case if 2sF ≥
πm(b0) − πm(b0 + x) while it is shared in duopoly if sF ≥ πd(b0) − πd(b0 + x). Proofs
of Propositions 1 and 3 then imply that, to prove Proposition 5, it suﬃces to show that
πm(b0) − πm(b0 + xd(s)) < 2πd(b0) − 2πd(b0 + xd(s)) = 2sF. Deﬁne L(b) ≡ πm(b) − 2πd(b),
and we ﬁnd L0(b) = b2
2(1+b)(2−b)2 > 0. This implies L(b0+x) > L(b0) ⇔ πm(b0)−πm(b0+x) <
2πd(b0) − 2πd(b0 + x) holds for all x ∈ (0,1 − b0). This implies the result. Q.E.D.
21Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that the monopolist develops just one type of platform with
quality x. We ﬁrst establish the following claim.
Claim 1: There does not exist an equilibrium in which the monopolist sells H-product to
type 2 consumers and L-product to type 1 consumers.
Proof: Suppose such an equilibrium exists, and let PH (PL) denote the price of H-product
(L-product) in the equilibrium. Then PH ≤ v2QH and v1QL − PL ≥ v1QH − PH must hold,
where QH ≡ QH(x) and QL ≡ QL(x). We then have that v2QL−PL ≥ v2QL−v1QL+v1QH−
PH > v2QH − PH, where the second inequality is implied by (v1 − v2)(QH − QL) > 0. But
v2QL−PL > v2QH−PH implies that type 2 consumers purchase L-product. A contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Claim 1 implies that, if the monopolist sells both H-product and L-product, it sells H-
product to all type 1 consumers and L-product to all type 2 consumers, and the monopolist’s
overall proﬁt under this option is πPS(x) as deﬁned in the text. Substituting and rearranging
yield
πPS(x) = (m1 + m2)v2x −
θ + m1 + m2
2
x
2 + Z1, (9)
where Z1 ≡ m1v1H + [(m1 + m2)v2 − m1v1]L − m1cH − m2cL. Hence, under this option the
monopolist chooses x = m1+m2








H−L , the relevant alternative option for the monopolist is to sell H-product
only. The monopolist can sell H-product to type 1 consumers at the price of v1QH(x), and
its overall proﬁt in this case is




2 + Z2, (11)
where Z2 ≡ m1v1H −m1cH. The monopolist chooses x = m1
θ+m1v1 ≡ x∗








Alternatively, the monopolist can sell H-product to both type 1 and type 2 consumers at





2(θ + m1 + m2)
+ Z3, (13)
22where Z3 ≡ (m1 + m2)v2H − (m1 + m2)cH.





m2 . Also, comparison of πPS(x∗)
and π∗
H1 yields that (m1+m2)v2−m1v1 > 0 must hold for πPS(x∗) > π∗
H1 to hold, and that,
given (m1 + m2)v2 − m1v1 > 0, there exists a unique value ˜ L(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2,cL) such that
πPS(x∗) > π∗
H1 ⇔ L > ˜ L(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2,cL). Then, Claim 2 below completes the proof of
Lemma 1.





m2 , and L > ˜ L(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2,cL) hold.
Proof: First note that v1 > v2 ⇒ v2 >
(m1+m2)v2−m1v1
m2 . Pick any θ,m1,m2,v1,v2,cL, and L
that satisfy (m1 +m2)v2 −m1v1 > 0 and L > ˜ L(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2,cL). We can pick H and cH





Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose that the monopolist sells H-product with platform
quality xH and L-product with platform quality xL in the equilibrium, where xH 6= xL.
Through the procedure analogous to the proof of Claim 1, we ﬁnd that the monopolist sells
H-product to all type 1 consumers and L-product to all type 2 consumers in the equilibrium,
and the monopolist’s overall proﬁt under this option is πNP(xH,xL) as deﬁned in the text.
Substituting and rearranging yield










L + Z1, (14)
where Z1 = m1v1H + [(m1 + m2)v2 − m1v1]L − m1cH − m2cL. Hence, under this option the
monopolist chooses xH = m1
θ+m1v1 ≡ x∗
H and xL =
(m1+m2)v2−m1v1
θ+m2 ≡ x∗










[(m1 + m2)v2 − m1v1]2
2(θ + m2)
+ Z1. (15)
Given Lemma 1, Claim 3 below completes the proof of Proposition 6.
Claim 3: There exists a unique value ˜ v2, m1
m1+m2v1 < ˜ v2 < v1, such that πPS(x∗) >
πNP(x∗
H,x∗
L) if v2 > ˜ v2 while πPS(x∗) < πNP(x∗
H,x∗
L) if v2 < ˜ v2.
Proof: We have that πPS(x∗) > πNP(x∗
H,x∗








L) ⇔ v1 > m1+m2
θ+m1+m2v2, and
this condition is satisﬁed because v1 > v2 and θ > 0. Then the Intermediate Value Theorem
implies the result. Q.E.D.
23Proof of Proposition 7: First note that each type 2 consumer’s surplus is zero in the
equilibrium of both subgames. Each type 1 consumer’s surplus is (v1 − v2)QL(x∗) ((v1 −
v2)QL(x∗





θ+m2 v2 implies (v1 − v2)QL(x∗) > (v1 − v2)QL(x∗
L). This
implies (i). Regarding the total surplus, given TSPS = πPS(x∗) + m1(v1 − v2)QL(x∗) ≡
TSPS(x∗) and TSNP = πNP(x∗
H,x∗
L) + m1(v1 − v2)QL(x∗
L) ≡ TSNP(x∗
H,x∗






(θ+m1+m2)(θ+m2) , which takes the same sign for all v2 ∈ ( m1
m1+m2v1,v1).
Proposition 6 and 7(i) then imply 7(ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose that ﬁrms H and L develop platforms separately at stage 1,
and each ﬁrm k (= H,L) sells a positive amount of k-product in the subsequent equilibrium.
Through a procedure analogous to the proof of Claim 1, we ﬁnd that there does not exist
a subsequent equilibrium in which ﬁrm H sells H-product to type 2 consumers and ﬁrm
L sells L-product to type 1 consumers. Then, ﬁrm k’s overall proﬁt in the equilibrium is
πk(xH,xL), which is as deﬁned in the text. Substituting and rearranging yield





H − m1(v1 − v2)xL + Z4, (16)
where Z4 ≡ m1[v1(H − L) + v2L − cH], and





L + Z5, (17)
where Z5 ≡ m2(v2L−cL). We then ﬁnd that the optimal choices of platform quality of ﬁrms
























Now suppose that, given xL = x∗
L, ﬁrm H chooses xH and sells H-product to all type 1
and type 2 consumers at stage 2. Then v2(H + xH) − PH = v2(L + x∗
L) − PL holds, where
Pk denotes the price ﬁrm k chooses. In the equilibrium PL = cL +
(x∗
L)2
2 holds, and hence




2 . Firm H’s overall proﬁt under this option is then
˜ πH(xH,x
∗








= (m1 + m2)v2xH −










) + Z6, (20)










2(θ + m1 + m2)






) + Z6. (21)
Now suppose that, given xH = x∗
H, ﬁrm L chooses xL and sells L-product to all type 1 and
type 2 consumers at Stage 2. Through the analogous procedure we ﬁnd that ﬁrm L chooses
xL = m1+m2
θ+m1+m2v2 ≡ x∗∗







2(θ + m1 + m2)






) − Z6. (22)
We then ﬁnd that in the subsequent stage 2 equilibrium, each ﬁrm k (= H,L) sells a
positive amount of k-product if and only if πH(x∗
H,x∗







L ) hold, where the latter inequality holds for all L. Finally, comparison of (18) and
(21) yields that there exists a unique value ˆ L ≥ 0 such that πH(x∗
H,x∗
L) > ˜ πH(x∗∗
H,x∗
L) holds
if and only if L ≥ ˆ L. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: Suppose that ﬁrms H and L jointly develop one type of plat-
form with quality xC. The analysis of the monopoly case implies that their joint proﬁt is
maximized when they choose xC = m1+m2
θ+m1+m2v2 ≡ ˆ x∗
C, and then ﬁrm H sells H-product with
quality QH(ˆ x∗
C) to all type 1 consumers while ﬁrm L sells L-product with quality QL(ˆ x∗
C) to
all type 2 consumers. We establish the following claim.
Claim 4: Suppose that ﬁrms H and L jointly developed one type of platform with quality
ˆ x∗
C at stage 1. Then, in the subsequent equilibrium, ﬁrm H sells H-product with quality
QH(ˆ x∗
C) to all type 1 consumers while ﬁrm L sells L-product with quality QL(ˆ x∗
C) to all type
2 consumers.
Proof: In the equilibrium described above, ﬁrm H’s stage 2 proﬁt is
πH(ˆ x
∗
















Now suppose that ﬁrm H sells H-product with quality QH(ˆ x∗
C) to all consumers at the price
of PH in the subsequent equilibrium. Then v2QH(ˆ x∗
C) − PH ≥ v2QL(ˆ x∗
C) − PL ⇔ PH ≤
v2(H − L) + PL must hold, where PL = cL +
(ˆ x∗
C)2




ﬁrm H’s stage 2 proﬁt is
˜ πH(ˆ x
∗




) = (m1 + m2)[v2(H − L) − (cH − cL)]. (24)
25Note that we have (m1 + m2)v2ˆ x∗
C − (θ + m1 + m2)
(ˆ x∗
C)2




2 > 0, and
v2L − cL > 0. We then have that πH(ˆ x∗
C) > m1(v1H − v1L + v2L − cL − cH + cL) >
m1[v1(H − L) − (cH − cL)] > (m1 + m2)[v2(H − L) − (cH − cL)] = ˜ πH(ˆ x∗
C), where the last




m2 . Hence, there does not exist an equilibrium
in which ﬁrm H sells H-product with quality QH(ˆ x∗
C) to all consumers. Similarly, we ﬁnd
that there does not exit an equilibrium in which ﬁrm L sells L-product with quality QL(ˆ x∗
C)
to all consumers. Finally, through a procedure analogous to the proof of Claim 1, we ﬁnd
that there does not exist an equilibrium in which ﬁrm H sells H-product to type 2 consumers
and ﬁrm L sells L-product to type 1 consumers. Q.E.D.
Claim 4 implies that, if ﬁrms H and L jointly develop one type of platform, they choose
xC = ˆ x∗





2(θ + m1 + m2)
+ Z1, (25)
where Z1 ≡ m1v1H + [(m1 + m2)v2 − m1v1]L − m1cH − m2cL.
From Lemma 2 and its proof we have that, if ﬁrms H and L develop platforms separately,














2(θ+m2) − m1(v1 − v2) m2v2
θ+m2. On the other hand,




C) = gPS(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2) + Z1, (27)
where gPS(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2) ≡
[(m1+m2)v2]2
2(θ+m1+m2). We have that gPS(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2) > gNP(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2)








if v2 = m1









thermore, it can be shown that ∂
∂v2(gPS(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2) − gNP(θ,m1,m2,v1,v2)) > 0. This
implies that there exists a unique value v0
2, m1
m1+m2v1 ≤ v0




L) + πL(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗
L) if v2 > v0
2 while πPS(ˆ x∗
C) < πH(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗
L) + πL(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗













Proof of Proposition 9: First note that each type 2 consumer’s surplus is zero in the
equilibrium of both subgames. Each type 1 consumer’s surplus is (v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
C) ((v1 −
26v2)QL(ˆ x∗
L)) in the equilibrium of platform sharing (non-platform sharing) subgame, where
ˆ x∗
C = m1+m2
θ+m1+m2v2 > ˆ x∗
L = m2
θ+m2v2 implies (v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
C) > (v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
L). Regarding
the total surplus, given TSPS = πPS(ˆ x∗
C) + m1(v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
C) ≡ TSPS(ˆ x∗
C) and TSNP =
πH(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗
L) + πL(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗
L) + m1(v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
L) ≡ TSNP(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗





(θ+m1+m2)(θ+m2) > 0 for all v2 ∈ ( m1
m1+m2v1,v1). Proposition 8 and
9(i) then imply 9(ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: We have that πNP(x∗
H,x∗
L) − [πH(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗




2(θ+m2) > 0. Given the deﬁnitions of ¯ v2 and ˜ v2, this implies ¯ v2 < ˜ v2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11: Suppose v2 > ˜ v2. Then Proposition 10 implies that a platform
is shared in the equilibrium of the monopoly case as well as the duopoly case. Propositions
6 and 8 then imply (i).
Next suppose v2 < ¯ v2. Then a platform is not shared in the equilibrium of the monopoly
case as well as the duopoly case. In the equilibrium of the monopoly case, (a) each type
1 consumer’s surplus is (v1 − v2)QL(x∗
L), (b) the monopolist’s proﬁt is πNP(x∗
H,x∗
L), and
(c) the total surplus is TSNP(x∗
H,x∗
L). In the equilibrium of the duopoly case, (a) each
type 1 consumer’s surplus is (v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
L), (b) the joint proﬁt of ﬁrms H and L is
πH(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗
L) + πL(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗
L), and (c) the total surplus is TSNP(ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗
L). We have that (v1 −
v2)QL(x∗
L) < (v1 −v2)QL(ˆ x∗
L) and πNP(x∗
H,x∗




L). Also, given that
(xH,xL) = (ˆ x∗
H, ˆ x∗






Finally, suppose ¯ v2 < v2 < ˜ v2. Then a platform is shared in the equilibrium of the duopoly
case but not shared in the equilibrium of the monopoly case. In the equilibrium of the
monopoly case, (a) each type 1 consumer’s surplus is (v1 − v2)QL(x∗
L), (b) the monopolist’s
proﬁt is πNP(x∗
H,x∗
L), and (c) the total surplus is TSNP(x∗
H,x∗
L). In the equilibrium of
the duopoly case, (a) each type 1 consumer’s surplus is (v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
C), (b) the joint
proﬁt of ﬁrms H and L is πPS(ˆ x∗
C), and (c) the total surplus is TSPS(ˆ x∗
C). We have that
(v1 − v2)QL(x∗
L) < (v1 − v2)QL(ˆ x∗
C), and πNP(x∗
H,x∗
L) > πPS(ˆ x∗
C). Also, given Proposition
9 we have that TSPS(ˆ x∗




L). This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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